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Abstract—In this paper, we present MORTON, a system
that identifies compromised enterprise devices (bots) without
relying on malicious domain name detection. To achieve this
goal, MORTON processes DNS requests made by enterprise
devices in order to identify routine communication to disreputable
host names. With its compact representation of the input data
and use of efficient signal processing and a neural network
for classification, MORTON is designed to be accurate, robust,
and scalable. We evaluate MORTON using a large dataset of
corporate DNS logs and compare MORTON to two recently
proposed systems aimed at detecting malware communication.
The results demonstrate that while MORTON’s accuracy is
comparable to that of the two systems for beaconing detection,
it outperforms the systems in terms of its ability to detect
sophisticated bot communication techniques such as multi-stage
channels, as well as its robustness and efficiency. MORTON was
also deployed to monitor real-world DNS traffic made by nine
world-wide enterprise over the course of 30 days. The real-world
results include previously unreported threats, and a low false
positive rate, thus demonstrating the effectiveness of MORTON
for real-world, unlabeled environments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Enterprise networks are prominent targets of malware and
potentially unwanted application (PUA) downloads [12]. After
malware or a PUA has been downloaded and executed on
an enterprise device, the device becomes compromised and
effectively becomes part of a bot network (botnet) controlled
by a remote attacker. The attacker exchanges control messages
with the bots it controls through a command and control (C&C)
channel, by which the attacker instructs the bots to carry out
attacks, such as data theft [22], [23] and DDoS attacks [35].
To protect against these attacks, numerous studies have
focused on the detection of bots that attempt to communicate
with their C&C, and in many studies this was achieved by
processing the domain name system (DNS) protocol logs [7],
[4], [14].
The DNS protocol is a core component of the Inter-
net whose primary goal is to translate a host name (e.g.,
google.com) to its hosting IP address (e.g., 8.8.8.8) [21]. Bots
often rely on the DNS protocol to acquire the hosting IP
address of their C&C server, because the IP address can be
changed whenever the existing hosting becomes blocked or
suspect. Modern botnets frequently change their C&C servers’
hosting IP addresses and domain names using techniques,
such as fast flux [10], and domain generation algorithms
(DGA) [24], in order to avoid being detected and blocked.
The fact that in many cases the botnet infrastructure utilizes the
DNS protocol has led to extensive research on detecting mali-
cious domain names in DNS logs by tracking patterns of fast
flux and DGA techniques, and identifying devices that query
these domain names as bots [39]. Despite the fact that the
practice of classifying bots based on the DNS protocol through
malicious domain name detection has been widely adopted, it
fails to detect all botnet communication, and less than 20%
of all malicious domain names are reported and eventually
added to DNS blacklists [13]. Given this, the primary aim of
this study is to explore and evaluate systems for classifying
bots in large-scale enterprise DNS traffic that complement
malicious domain name detection but don’t rely on it. More
specifically, we are interested in system methods that detect
bots by identifying routine communication to disreputable host
names.
Prior studies [11], [30] that attempted to identify bots with-
out relying on malicious domain name detection focused on a
bot communication technique called “beaconing.” Beaconing
refers to a bot communication technique in which a recurring
message is sent from bots to a constant, predetermined host
name (i.e., domain name) so that a bot herder can know the lat-
est time at which a bot was available. This goal is achieved by
applying periodicity detection on DNS connection pairs — the
outgoing DNS queries from a specific device to a specific host
name. Connection pairs that exhibit periodicity are suspected
as botnet communication which should be investigated by an
enterprise’s CERT team and/or by using automated techniques.
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Existing beaconing detection systems for identifying bots
suffer from several limitations. First, the number of connection
pairs in large-scale enterprises might significantly exceed the
number of devices, and therefore, the systems rely heavily on
eliminating less suspicious host names prior to classification
to provide acceptable performance and a low false alarm
rate. Second, the classification of each connection pair often
involves periodicity detection algorithms that strongly favor
accuracy over run-time due to the underlying assumption that
many connection pairs will be eliminated. Lastly, attackers
may communicate with their bots through multiple host names,
which, despite being recurring, aren’t captured within any
single connection pair. One notable example of a bot com-
munication technique that involves multiple host names is
multistage channels [19], in which a bot communicates with
a set of host names throughout its lifecycle; for instance, the
TrickBot and Emotet banking Trojans, which are considered
major business security threats [27], [32], [26], make use
of multistage channels, thus demonstrating the importance
of identifying bot communication that involves multiple host
names.
In this paper, we present MORTON: a system for
malicious routine detection on large-scale DNS traffic. MOR-
TON analyzes DNS communication logs of enterprise devices
in large-scale corporate networks and identifies devices that
periodically communicate with a set of disreputable domains.
In contrast to prior studies, MORTON does not rely heavily
on elimination to reduce the number of connection pairs
examined, because it classifies the outgoing DNS requests
made by a device directly, rather than indirectly classifying
connection pairs. Direct classification of devices as bots has
two main advantages. First, direct classification is faster,
because it involves less classification tasks (i.e., the number
of enterprise devices is significantly smaller than the number
of connection pairs). Second, direct classification can be used
to detect malicious routines that include multiple host names,
such multistage and multihop attacks.
The evaluation in this study compares MORTON with
Baywatch [11] and the adaption of WARP [9] to DNS logs
as proposed by Shalaginov et al. [30], two recently proposed
systems designed to identify malware beaconing. The dataset
used in the evaluation consists of real DNS logs that were
collected from 16,000 managed devices of eight worldwide
corporate networks over the course of a week. The devices
in the dataset are assumed not to be bots due to the scarcity
of C&C communication on managed enterprise devices. To
obtain malicious labels (i.e., bots), we select a subset of the
devices in the dataset into which we inject DNS queries of
malware beaconing and multistage channel communication.
The labeled dataset is used to evaluate three important aspects
of bot detection methods: accuracy, robustness to noise, and
scalability.
Our results demonstrate that malware beaconing is suc-
cessfully detected by all of the evaluated methods (AUC >
0.85), however multistage channels are detected by MORTON
(AUC > 0.85) but overlooked by the other two methods
(AUC < 0.72). We measure robustness using a score that
embodies the detection rate as a function of unobserved traffic
(i.e., noise). For beaconing detection, MORTON and Baywatch
are tied for the highest robustness score, but for multistage
channels, MORTON dominates the other methods. Moreover,
we found that it only took MORTON 70 seconds to be applied
on the entire test set (containing 700,000 connection pairs), a
rate which was almost a hundred times faster than Baywatch
and an even more impressive thousand times faster than WARP.
MORTON was also deployed to monitor nine large-scale
enterprise network environments for a period of 30 days. The
results of MORTON throughout the deployment time consist
of several case studies that are manually investigated and
analyzed by experts. The case studies include a bot that uses
a multi-stage channel technique, namely IsErik [1]), and other
bots, namely Nestha [31] and uBlock [3], that demonstrate
the practicality of MORTON in a real-world, unsupervised
environment.
We summarize our papers contributions as follows:
1) We introduce MORTON, an accurate, robust, and
efficient system to detect routine bot communication
in large-scale DNS traffic. MORTON is capable of
detecting bot communication techniques that were
thus far overlooked by other periodicity detection
systems (e.g., multistage channels).
2) We provide a comparison of MORTON and recently
proposed methods on a large-scale DNS dataset to
evaluate accuracy, robustness to noise, and efficiency.
3) We present the results of MORTON on real-world,
large-scale DNS logs that were produced by nine
worldwide enterprises over the course of a month.
The results include several case studies that are
investigated and analyzed by experts to demonstrate
the practicality of MORTON in a real-world, unsu-
pervised environment.
II. BACKGROUND
A bot can communicate with its C&C server using various
techniques, that may involve either a single host name or
multiple host names. A bot communication technique that uses
a single host name for C&C communication is easier to set
up and less expensive compared to one that uses multiple host
names. Traditionally, bot communication techniques have often
taken place through a single host name. Notable examples of
such techniques include malware beaconing established for lo-
cal scheduling [18], scheduled file transfers [20], connectivity
checks, and automated exfiltration [15], [22].
The primary drawback of bot communication techniques
that use a single host name is their lack of robustness. This
is because the single host name is effectively a single point
of failure for the botnet infrastructure. If the host name
is unavailable for any reason, then the bot herder cannot
control its bots. An additional drawback is that a single host
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name may also be less covert. For instance, in the case of
DNS data exfiltration, every exfiltration message is sent to
an attacker host name. Host names that get a large volume
of exfiltration messages become more detectable by security
systems [22]. Therefore, bots that split their volume of DNS
exfiltration messages and send them to multiple host names,
makes the multiple host names more covert than a single host
name. These drawbacks are addressed by bot communication
techniques that use multiple host names.
The most well-known use of multiple host names for botnet
communication is through domain generation algorithms [16]
(DGAs) which have been used by over 40 known botnets [24].
DGAs are used by bots and attackers to generate and select
the domain names used to establish the C&C communication
channel. Most bots that use DGAs generate new domain names
on a daily basis [24], thus pointing to the importance of
detecting bot communication that use multiple domain names.
Multistage channels are another bot communication tech-
nique in which multiple host names are used. When a bot is
first installed onto a compromised device, the bot is referred
to as the first stage of the infection. Throughout the first
stage, the bot communicates with its C&C through either a
single host name or a multiple host name. However, the host
names will change when the first stage bot requires an upgrade.
A bot upgrade typically involves communicating with a new
host name to download a module that enhances the bot with
additional capabilities. The upgraded bot is now referred to as
the second stage of the infection. The multistage channel bot
communication technique often involves several stages, and
therefore, multiple host names to gradually upgrade their bots.
The use of multistage channels improves the robustness of
a botnet’s infrastructure, because security researchers cannot
easily identify the different host names that will be used by
a botnet in order to shut down its operation (i.e., preventing
bots from upgrading).
Other cases of bot communication techniques in which
multiple host names are used include fallback channels [17]
and multi-hop proxies. In fallback channels, a bot that fails
to communicate with its C&C host name attempts to commu-
nicate to the host name next in line, based on a prioritized
list of host names. Multi-hop proxies is a bot communication
technique in which the C&C channel is established through
a series of proxy servers that are associated with different
host names. The series of proxy servers between bots and
their C&C servers prevents security researchers from easily
matching a bot its C&C server based on network logs.
Figure 1 illustrates bot communication techniques that use
a single host name or conversely, multiple host names. The first
example (top) includes the malware beaconing technique with
a single host name C&C communication. The second example
(middle) includes a multistage channel technique in which a
different host name is used in each stage. The last example
(bottom) includes a DGA-based technique where various dif-
ferent host names are used each day for bot communication.
III. RELATED WORK
The detection of compromised devices over DNS has been
thoroughly studied over the last decade. In the most commonly
studied approach, malicious domain names are detected in the
DNS traffic, and devices that query these malicious domain
names are assumed to be compromised [39]. Malicious domain
name detection is extremely effective against botnets that use
DGAs [4], [24], [38], Fast- flux [7], [10], and DNS data
exfiltration [22], [23]. Nevertheless, identifying compromised
devices based only on their access to malicious domain names
is limited, thus driving further research aimed at detecting
compromised devices without evidence about the malicious
domain names they access.
A complementary approach, which is the subject of this
study, is to explore the periodicity of communication between
devices and disreputable host names on the Internet, based on
the assumption that bot devices must consistently communicate
with their C&C servers.
Hu et al. adapted a general periodicity detection scheme
called AUTOPERIOD [34] for the network security domain,
proposing Baywatch [11], a system that detects malware bea-
coning over the DNS protocol. The Baywatch system works
by grouping DNS logs into connection pairs of devices and
host names, eliminating pairs with reputable host names, and
applies the AUTOPERIOD scheme with additional hypothesis
testing to the logs of every remaining pair. The hypothesis
testing is conducted by generating m (typically set to 100)
random permutations of the DNS logs of every connection
pair, so that the periodicity of every connection pair’s DNS
logs is evaluated in comparison to its permutations. Generating
m permutations for every connection pair and comparing their
periodicity to the original connection pair is a an inefficient
task. Therefore, the primary drawback of Baywatch is that
unless the elimination of reputable host names dramatically
reduces the number of connection pairs, then the system
becomes inefficient and can’t properly scale for an increased
number of enterprise devices. An additional drawback is that
because Baywatch applies periodicity detection for connection
pairs, it is inherently less effective against bot communication
that involves multiple host names like multi-stage channels,
multi-hop proxies, and fallback channels.
Research performed by Shalaginov et al. [30] also proposes
a beaconing detection system that classifies connection pairs.
In contrast to Baywatch which uses hypothesis testing, Shalagi-
nov et al. proposed representing the DNS logs of connection
pairs as symbols that match smoothed inter-arrival times (e.g.,
two messages 10-20 seconds apart would be replaced with the
symbol ‘a’). The characters representation enabled Shalaginov
et al. to integrate an existing variety of periodicity detection
algorithms that identify character repetitiveness [9], [25], [8]
into their system. Similarly to Baywatch, the system proposed
by Shalaginov et al. eliminates connection pairs with reputable
host names, but it also goes further and eliminates connection
pairs with verbose communication. Accordingly, the system
3
Beaconing
Multi-Stage Channels
Si
ng
le
 H
os
tn
am
e
M
ul
tip
le
 H
os
tn
am
es
C&C C&C C&C
p3mx9.info p3mx9.info p3mx9.info
C&C C&C C&C
cn932a.net dj2j1.net j9d2m.net
C&C C&CC&C C&C C&CC&C C&C C&CC&C
nbdw8.com d9kd2.com p2md1.com md9d1.com dfs81s.com mm452.com aslk12.com jhb13.com d2445s.com
Time
Time
Time
Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA)16:00
8:00
8:00
16:00
00:00
00:00
Fig. 1: Bot communication techniques examples. An example of a malware beaconing technique with a single host name (top); a
multistage channel technique, where a different host name is used in each stage (middle); and DGA-based C&C communication,
where various different host names are used every day (bottom).
proposed by Shalaginov et al. is expected to suffer from the
same drawbacks as Baywatch (i.e., poor scalability if the
number of connection pairs is not dramatically reduced and
the inherent inability to identify bot communication that goes
through multiple host names), because it indirectly classifies
connection pairs.
MORTON addresses the drawbacks of Baywatch and the
system proposed by Shalaginov et al. by directly classifying
the outgoing DNS queries made by a device rather than an
indirect classification of connection pairs. The benefits of
direct classification is that its efficiency is independent in
the number of connection pairs, and it is more suitable for
detecting botnet communication that goes through multiple
host names.
In several other studies [6], [2], [5], the authors used
periodicity detection to identify bots, but also leveraged ad-
ditional information that is not available in DNS requests to
provide accurate results (e.g., NetFlow logs). Despite reporting
accurate results, they are not applicable on DNS logs on their
own.
IV. MORTON
A. Overview
MORTON consists of two main phases: data process-
ing and classification. The data processing phase (see Sec-
tion IV-C) part transforms the input, a time series of outgo-
ing DNS queries, to a power spectral density (PSD) vector
that characterizes the intensity of periodic communication at
various frequencies. The transformation starts by filtering the
time series of DNS queries from reputable host names that
aren’t relevant for bot communication. Then, the filtered time
series of DNS queries are counted based on equal-length time
frames. The data processing ends by applying discrete Fourier
transform (DFT) on the DNS query counts to produce the PSD
vector. In the classification phase a neural network classifies
the PSD vector based on whether the device that made the
DNS queries is a bot or not.
B. Definitions
An outgoing DNS query (Q) that is made by internal device
(D) to a host name H at time (T ) is represented as a tuple
that appears in Equation 1.
Q =< D,H, T > (1)
The device D can be represented using a string ID (e.g.,
“b1ec3636” or “cbb6d92”). The host name can include the
DNS resource record type (see [21]) because a different
resource record type can be regarded as an entirely different
service from a bot communication perspective. For instance: a
bot communication that uses the DNS query “example.com.,
A” is not necessarily related to a DNS query “example.com.,
MX” that is made by legitimate services to learn about e-mail
services. The time T can be represented in various forms, but
for consistency, we refer to it as Unix time in milliseconds,
which is defined as the number of milliseconds that have
passed since January 1, 1970 [37]. For example, the tuple
< b1ec3636, “example.com.,A′′, 1595933003000 >
represents an outgoing DNS query of type A to resolve the
host name “example.com.” at time 1595933003000 (July 28,
2020).
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Fig. 2: A scheme of MORTON training and deployment. Training (1) consists of a dataset of DNS requests that belong to
legitimate devices and bot devices into which malicious data was injected. The labeled data is used to train a neural network that
classifies a newly observed time series of DNS requests based on whether the requests were made by a bot or not. Deployment
(2) consists of a neural network processing and classifying new series of DNS requests. In turn, (a) MORTON identifies new
bots, and (b) reports them for further investigation by an enterprise’s CERT team (c).
The input to MORTON is a series of DNS queries that were
made by a specific device (Di) within a predetermined time
frame that starts at Ts and ends at Te. The input is formally
defined in Equation 2.
I(Di,Ts,Te) = {Q|(D = Di) ∧ (Ts ≤ T < Te)} (2)
In this manner, MORTON can process and classify whether
a device “b1ec3636” is a bot or not, based on its series of
outgoing DNS queries, as they appear in the example below:
{< b1ec3636, “example.com.,A′′, 1595933003000 >
...
< b1ec3636, “example.net., AAAA′′, 1595933005301 >}
C. Data processing
1) Filtering: MORTON’s input might contain a large num-
ber of queries to host names that are assumed to be trusted.
Accordingly, the goal of the data filtering part is to remove
queries to reputable host names from the input in order to
decrease the processing time and improve the accuracy. These
benefits make data filtering processes very common in methods
that attempt to detect malicious routines [11], [30].
The data filtering process that is applied in MORTON is
standard and is based on the ideas of global and local repu-
tation ranking that appear in [11]. Global reputation dictates
that a host name is reputable, and therefore should be trusted,
if it is listed in publicly available lists that are often associated
with benign host names (e.g., the Alexa Top 1M list). Local
reputation complements global reputation by dictating that the
host names are also regarded as trusted if they are queried by
a sufficiently large portion of devices in the network.
We define a filtering function C that outputs a true value
indicating if a Q should remain. The filtering function respects
both the global reputation and the local reputation using special
parameters, φG and φL. φG defines the number of highest-
ranking Alexa top 1M domains that are regarded as trusted.
φL defines the minimal rate of querying devices to consider a
host name as trusted. For instance, if φG is set to 100,000 and
φL is set to 0.3, then host names that are ranked below 100,000
in the Alexa top 1M list or are accessed by at least 30% of
the devices within the observed time frame are regarded as
trusted and are filtered away from the input. Both φG and φL
are listed as MORTON’s parameters in Table I.
Formally, the filtering is applied to the input using the
filtering function as defined in Equation 3, which results in
a filtered input.
Ic(Di,Ts,Te) = {Q|(D = Di) ∧ (Ts ≤ T < Te) ∧ (C(Q) is True)} (3)
2) DNS Query Counts: The DNS query counts part trans-
forms a filtered input, a series of outgoing DNS queries, into
a series of DNS queries count that are associated with equal
length time frames. Counting results in a loss of information,
but it has several important advantages. First, the resulting
counts are dramatically smaller than the filtered input, thereby
reducing the processing time. Second, counting reduces the
size of the data to a constant size, regardless of the filtering
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function configuration, therefore allowing MORTON to effi-
ciently process a large number of disreputable host names.
Lastly, an aware bot herder can design its bots so they wait
for a random period of time before every communication so as
to appear less periodic and evade periodicity detection. The use
of counting results in discrete time frames (e.g., hourly query
counts) which limits an aware bot herder in evading detection.
For instance, an aware bot herder that knows MORTON was
configured to use hourly time frames, would have to choose
between communicating within an hour of the communication
time and becoming detected, or delaying communication by
over an hour thus reducing the botnet’s effectiveness.
Formally, the counting of the filtered input is defined in
Equation 4, where ti represents the number of overall DNS
queries that were made in the i-th time frame, and N is the
overall number of time frames of length λ seconds.
T(Di,Ts,Te) = (t1, t2, t3, .., ti, .., tN ) (4)
MORTON can be configured to use different values of N
and λ (see Table I). Lower λ values will result in shorter time
frames that provide better data granularity for accuracy, while
higher values will result in longer time frames that provide
greater efficiency through a smaller representation. Higher N
values will result in the system inspecting more time frames,
thus making it more sensitive to detections that occur over a
period of time, but less efficient, because the input becomes
larger.
The following example demonstrates how the DNS query
counts are computed. Consider an enterprise that decides to
deploy MORTON to produce hourly classifications. In this
case, the enterprise will use time frames of one hour (i.e.,
λ = 3600 seconds) and the total number of time frames for one
week (i.e., N=168). Every hour, the series of DNS queries that
are performed by each user during the last week are counted
into N = 168 time frames of λ = 3600 seconds, that represent
the number of DNS requests made to disreputable host names.
The resulted DNS query counts will be of the form:
(t1 = 0, t1 = 4, t2 = 0, ..., t167 = 4)
For brevity, for the remainder of the paper we refer to the
DNS query count T(Di,Ts,Te) simply as T .
3) Power spectral density (PSD) computation: A power
spectral density (PSD) vector is a common data representation
form in the field of periodicity detection. The PSD vector
is defined as the squared magnitude of the discrete Fourier
transform (DFT) coefficients for a given input. PSD vectors
are used to estimate the spectral density within a time series
signal, which later allows classifiers to more easily identify
periods in which a repetitive behavior takes place. Intuitively,
a PSD vector can be thought of as the “intensity” of the rate of
events at particular time frequencies. Accordingly, a frequency
entry within the PSD vector that has a high value indicates that
a routine event with that frequency.
First, DFT is applied to the DNS query counts T as shown
in Equation 5:
DFT (T, k) =
N−1∑
n=0
t
e−i2pi knN
n (5)
where k = 0, 1, ..., N − 1.
By definition, every PSD vector entry (frequency) is de-
fined as descrbied in Equation 6:
Fi =
∥∥∥∥DFT(T, 0)∥∥∥∥2 (6)
resulting in a PSD vector of the form 7:
PSD(T ) =
(
F0, F1, ..., FN−1
2 −1
)
(7)
For example, if the number of time frames is N = 168,
then the output PSD will have N−12 = 83 entries, as shown
below:
(F0 = 0.145, F1 = 0.03, .., F82 = 0.01)
4) Normalization: The values of the PSD vectors are
unbounded and of different magnitudes, and therefore they
must be normalized prior to classification. The normalization
of PSD vectors in MORTON scales the amplitude of every
frequency to a value between zero and one, which is pro-
portional to the original values that appear in the training set.
The resulting normalized PSD vector is guaranteed to maintain
the same “distribution of energy” for every frequency and a
consistent scale for classification. The normalized PSD vector
is henceforth referred to as PSD(T ).
TABLE I: MORTON’s parameters
Parameter Description Possible Values
φG Global reputation max rank Integer between 0 and 1,000,000.
φL Local reputation percentile [0,1].
lambda A time frame length in seconds Non-negative integer
N Number of time frames Non-negative integer
D. Classification
MORTON trains a vanilla feedforward neural network; this
type of neural network is commonly used for classification
tasks with well structured input due to its performance. The
feedforward network parameters (θ) are learned in advanced,
and the network is applied as a function (F ) on the normalized
PSD to output a classification result (Y ), as specified in
Equation 8:
Y = F (θ, PSD(T )) (8)
The result (Y ) is a continuous value ranging from zero to one,
where higher values indicate greater certainty that the input
series of DNS queries was made by a bot or not.
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TABLE II: Examples of log lines
DNS Query Timestamp Device Host
1585633874000 b1ec3636 google.com, A
1585633874013 b1ec3636 malicious.net, A
1585633874024 cbb62d92 facebook.com, AAAA
... ... ...
V. EVALUATION
A. Dataset
The dataset used for the evaluation is based on real DNS
logs from Akamai’s DNS traffic that cover eight enterprise
networks. The DNS logs are all from the week beginning
January 1, 2020, and include 16,000 devices used in a variety
of time zones. Every DNS log line matches the input format
that is defined in Section IV-B using three fields: the DNS
request timestamp, a unique identifier that is associated with
a device, and a host name. The DNS request timestamp is
represented in epochs using a millisecond resolution. The
unique identifiers for devices are provided using a client-side
agent that is installed on the devices, thus guaranteeing that
every outgoing DNS query is correctly associated with its
sending device. The host name is listed alongside the DNS
resource record type (e.g., a DNS request for the google[.]com
IPv4 record will be listed as “google.com, A”). Three examples
of log lines in the dataset can be seen in Table II.
The dataset is supervised, and therefore every device must
be labeled as either a benign device, or alternatively, a bot.
Our main assumption is that managed enterprise devices are
rarely part of a botnet. Therefore, we label all of the devices
in the dataset as benign, except for a subset of devices (5%)
into which we inject malicious bot communication traffic.
The malicious bot communication traffic that was injected
is characterized using three variables:
1) The time interval (in minutes) between consecutive
malicious queries,
2) The number of DNS queries that are sent in every
interval, and
3) The malicious host name (or names) to which the
DNS queries are sent.
The time interval is an integer number, and it is sampled
uniformly with possible values ranging from 120 minutes
(i.e., communicate every two hours) to 720 minutes (i.e.,
communicate every 12 hours). The number of queries made
for each interval is also sampled uniformly with values ranging
from five to 15. For the beaconing detection experiment, the
malicious domain name is set to a single host name that doesn’t
appear in the dataset. For the multistage channel detection
experiment, we compile a set of six host names that do not
appear in the dataset. Then, we select the number of host names
to be used (between three and six), and for every DNS query
we select random host names from the set.
The 16,000 devices are split into a training set of 10,000
devices and a test set of 6,000. Both the training set and the
test set include a similar proportion of malicious devices (5%).
Dataset filtering is performed using the following configura-
tion: φG = 500, 000 and φL = 0.03, i.e., only the top 500,000
host names on the Alexa Top 1M list and host names that
are queried by at least 3% of the devices throughout the past
week are assumed reputable. This configuration is conservative
in the sense that the Alexa Top 1M list is not free of malicious
domains, especially its lower ranked host names [29], and
therefore it cannot be fully trusted. The dataset is described
in Table III.
TABLE III: Dataset properties
Training set Test set
# Devices 10,000 6,000
% Bot class 5% 5%
# Connection pairs 1,149,635 743,586
# Unique domain names 736,181 526,346
# Worldwide corporations 8 8
B. Evaluation environment
The entire evaluation is conducted on a cloud computing
instance (AWS EC2 c5.x18 xlarge1), with extensive com-
putational and memory resources, to correctly simulate the
hardware of a large-scale enterprise network. The specification
of the instance includes 72 virtual CPUs (vCPU), 144 GB of
memory, and a 550GB EBS disk.
C. Methods compared
The experiment compares the following systems: MOR-
TON, Baywatch [11], and WARP as proposed by Shalaginov
et al. [30] on detecting beaconing and multistage channels.
The Baywatch system in particular is evaluated using two
different settings, namely a fast setting and an accurate setting,
to account for the range of achievable results by the system.
The comparison of the systems focuses on the accuracy of
detection, robustness to noise in the data, and the run-time
performance.
1) MORTON: The neural network architecture with which
MORTON performed best consists of the following:
1) An input layer with a number of units to match the
number of PSD values,
2) A hidden layer with 25 neurons with a ReLU activa-
tion function and L2 regularization,
3) A hidden layer with 55 neurons with a ReLU activa-
tion function,
4) A hidden layer with 25 neurons with a ReLU activa-
tion function, and
5) A output layer with a sigmoid activation function.
1https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/instance-types/c5/
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Fig. 3: Receiver operating characteristic of MORTON, Baywatch, and WARP with different m values on the test set.
Our evaluation and the results presented are based on this
architecture.
The training of the neural network is conducted with a
dropout setting on the dense layer with a rate of 0.1; this is
done to regulate the training so it will use all of the neurons and
achieve its optimal performance. Early stopping is defined so
that if the validation loss remains roughly unchanged for five
consecutive epochs, the training stops. The Adam optimizer is
used to minimize the binary cross-entropy loss.
2) Baywatch: The Baywatch system has exactly two pa-
rameters, C and m, both of which are explained below, because
they significantly affect the trade-off between the run-time
of the system and the desired level of confidence. The C
parameter is a continuous value between zero and one, and
it is used to indicate the level of certainty. The m parameter is
a discrete positive value that is used to construct a baseline of
m non-periodic signals, based on which the system is able to
establish the significance of the periodicity signal observed.
For every connection pair between a device and a queried
domain name, Baywatch generates m random permutations
of the input time series. Then, if the maximal value of the
PSD belonging to the original time series is within the C
percentile of the maximal value of the PSD belonging to the
m random permutations of the time series, the connection pair
of the machine and queried domain name is classified as a
pair that is engaged in a periodic communication channel.
Based on this behavior, assignments of higher m values would
produce a more robust baseline to assure more accurate results
while increasing the run-time of the overall autocorrelation
function (ACF) linearly. Accordingly, the evaluation includes
two different settings to best reflect Baywatch’s performance:
an accurate setting (m = 100), as was evaluated in the original
study, and a fast setting (m = 10). For each of these settings,
we evaluate different confidence values that are commonly
used for a low false alarm rate in security systems, i.e.,
C = 0.9, 0.99, 0.999. For the sake of brevity, we henceforth
refer to the two settings as Baywatch-10 and Baywatch-100.
3) WARP: Shalaginov et al. presents a general system for
periodicity detection. Within the general system, connection
pairs of internal devices and external host names are extracted
and processed to return the length of the minimal periodic
cycle. Processing specific connection pairs consists of com-
puting the time difference between consecutive DNS queries,
smoothing the time difference, and replacing the smoothed
time difference values with unique symbols that form a string.
The string formed is provided to an underlying periodicity
detection algorithm that process strings. Shalaginov et al.
propose four potential underlying periodicity detection algo-
rithms, and our implementation relies on one of them, namely
“WARP” [9]. The other periodicity detection algorithms that
were mentioned in the study require parameter settings that
were not provided in the paper; WARP is the only algorithm
that we could guarantee would perform similar to the version
evaluated by Shalaginov et al.. Our beaconing and multistage
experiments consist of a repeating query with a constant inter-
arrival time. Therefore, if the returned minimal periodic cycle
is one, we classify the connection pair as periodic, because
all time differences between consecutive queries are equal
after smoothing. Otherwise, we classify the connection as non-
periodic. The smoothing variance is defined by a parameter
s, so that the modulo of the time difference from s is
removed. Accordingly, higher s values make the classification
more sensitive (i.e., having a higher recall score, but a lower
precision score).
D. Evaluation results
1) Classification accuracy comparison: Our first experi-
ment deals with the accuracy of the evaluated systems by
analyzing receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves that
describe the systems detection rates on the test set. The ROC
curves for detecting beaconing and multistage channels are
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presented in Figure 3. The graphs are analyzed from two
perspectives:
1) The area under the curve (AUC), which provides a
single scalar value to represent the trade-off between
the false positive rate (FPR) and true positive rate
(TPR);
2) The TPR for a fixed and low FPR (1%), which is
often the setting in automated cybersecurity systems
in order to reduce the number of false alarms that
must be investigated by an enterprise CERT.
For beaconing detection, WARP is the most accurate sys-
tem (AUC=0.97), followed by MORTON (AUC=0.85) and
Baywatch-100 (AUC=0.85), and finally by the fast Baywatch-
10 (AUC=0.64). The AUC scores show that all systems are ca-
pable of detecting beaconing with high accuracy, with WARP
performing best. Despite that, for a low FPR value of 1%, only
MORTON was able to produce adequate results with a TPR
value of 77%, compared to the rest of the systems that weren’t
able to produce any detection with the low FPR value. For
Baywatch, setting the confidence parameter C to 1.0 resulted
in a minimal FPR of 14.4%, thus reflecting Baywatch’s lack of
sensitivity, which is addressed by the authors who mention the
need to apply additional methods to reduce the FPR further.
For WARP, the lowest s value of zero (i.e., highest confidence)
results in a minimal FPR of 3%, which is more sensitive than
Baywatch but less sensitive than MORTON. Effectively, the
automated use of these systems to detect beaconing with an
acceptable FPR of less than 3% can only be achieved by either
using MORTON on its own or by applying one of the other
two methods with additional filtering to reduce the FPR after
detection.
For multistage channel detection, MORTON (AUC=0.85)
is the most accurate system; it is followed by the accurate
Baywatch-100 (AUC=0.72), Shalginov-WARP (0.58), and the
fast Baywatch-10 (0.56). Similarly to the beaconing experi-
ment, systems other than MORTON weren’t able to produce
any detection when configured to a low FPR value of 1%.
The lowest possible FPR value for which the system produced
a detection were FPR=14.4% for Baywatch and FPR=3% for
WARP. In contrast to the beaconing accuracy test, MORTON
dominates the accuracy evaluation for multistage channels,
with higher TPR values for every FPR value, thus making
MORTON more suitable for the detection of multistage chan-
nels in general and for automatic detection in particular.
2) Robustness: Bots that are configured to periodically
communicate with their C&C server aren’t always able to do
so. For instance, the act of turning off a compromised device
will immediately prevent an installed bot from communicating.
Accordingly, an important aspect to consider when evaluating
bot communication detection systems is their ability to detect
bots even when some of their routine communication logs are
lacking. An additional important example in which the routine
communication may be lacking is due to an attacker that
attempts to evade detection systems by preventing an install
bot from sending some of the communication.
We refer to this aspect as the robustness of a periodicity
detection method. To evaluate the robustness, we create an
experiment that simulates dropped communication and define
a new metric that we refer to as the robustness score, which
is explained in detail below.
The experiment for evaluating robustness draws similarity
to the experiment for evaluating accuracy except for two
modifications. First, we define the notion of a drop rate – the
rate of malicious DNS queries to drop from the dataset. This
experiment was conducted with 10 different drop rate values
ranging from 0% (i.e., no drop) and increasing by 10% until
a 90% drop is reached. Second, we define a acceptable false
positive rate that applies for all of the systems, which is crucial
for the detection rate to be comparable. The acceptable false
positive rate is determined to be 0.144, because it is the lowest
FPR value for which all of the systems are capable of detecting
at least one bot in the test set (see Figure 3). Eventually, the
rate of bots that were successfully detected ,while respecting
the acceptable FPR, are reported as the detection rate.
The experiment results in a function that maps drop rate
values to detection rates, which is henceforth referred to as
the robustness function. The area that is captured between
the robustness function and the x-axis is referred to as the
robustness score. The robustness score is a scalar that describes
the level of robustness provided by a system that detects
periodic signals. The score ranges between zero and one,
and a perfect score of one signifies a system with a perfect
detection rate when dealing with varying rates of dropped
traffic. Accordingly, the evaluation of robustness deals with the
robustness score of the different systems for both beaconing
and multistage channels.
The robustness scores of all of the systems evaluated are
presented in Figure 4. For beaconing detection, the highest
robustness score (0.697) was achieved by both MORTON and
Baywatch, whereas WARP received a score of 0.402. For
multistage channels, MORTON (0.697) performed best and
was followed by Baywatch (0.393) and WARP (0.211).
3) Run-time performance comparison: To better under-
stand the relationship between the number of devices in the
dataset and the run-time performance of the compared systems,
we select subsets of the original dataset where the number
of machines varies. This sampling results in 11 subsets of
the original datasets with 21, 22, 24, ...210, and 211 machine
IDs that were randomly selected from the original dataset.
The systems compared are then implemented on each of the
datasets sampled to estimate the total number of seconds
required for bot communication detection. The results are
portrayed in Figure 5. The largest sample consisted of 2048
devices, and slightly more than 700,000 connection pairs. For
that amount of devices and connection pairs, MORTON was
the fastest at bot communication detection. When MORTON
was applied on the entire test set, it took slightly more than 70
seconds to complete. The fast Baywatch-10 took 16 minutes
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(a) Beaconing (b) Multistage Channels
Fig. 4: The robustness scores of MORTON, Baywatch, and WARP for beaconing (a) and multistage channels (b).
(100x),the accurate Baywatch-100 took almost three hours
(1000x), and WARP took almost 24 hours (10000x). The
number of devices within a large enterprise network can be
significantly larger than 2048 devices thus resulting in even
greater differences.
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Fig. 5: The run-time (in seconds) of MORTON, Baywatch-10,
and Baywatch-100, and WARP with different m values on the
test set.
4) Summary of results: A summary of the evaluation results
is presented in Table IV.
VI. REAL-WORLD ANALYSIS
A. Overview
In this section, we present the results of MORTON on
real-world, large-scale DNS logs that were produced by nine
worldwide enterprises over the course of a month. The results
are manually validated by cybersecurity experts who analyzed
the data to validate MORTON’s practicality in a real-world,
unsupervised environment.
The setup for the deployment consists of a neural network
architecture and training data similar to that described in
Section V. Throughout the deployment period, MORTON
was applies on DNS logs that were collected from Akamai
servers who monitors DNS traffic for large enterprise networks.
Because of the unsupervised nature of the data (i.e., unlabeled)
cybersecurity experts needed to validate the data. A manual
validation requires extensive time, and therefore, the experts
were asked to validate only a limited sample of the DNS logs.
The limited sample consists of DNS requests obtained from
10,000 devices that belong to nine large enterprise networks.
All of the DNS requests in the sample were made on 30
days starting at May of 2020. The size of the sample is
sufficiently large to capture the threat landscape, while also
being manageable for manual analysis.
The analysis methodology relies on a majority vote by a
team of three cybersecurity experts. Each of the experts was
provided with a set of enterprise devices that were classified
as bots by MORTON within a specific week. The experts had
access to the set of outgoing DNS queries made by the bot-
classified devices for that week. Based on the logs, as well
as open-source tools (e.g., VirusTotal), an expert had to label
each classified device as either:
1) A bot, which is verified as malicious.
2) A bot, which is unverified as malicious.
3) Not a bot (i.e., a false positive).
Manual analysis of cybersecurity data presents challenges due
to incomplete and unavailable data. We therefore anticipated
cases in which an expert would be unable to make a conclusive
classification. False positives in security systems are often
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Category MORTON Baywatch-10 (Fast) Baywatch-100 (Accurate) WARP
AUC Beaconing 0.85 0.64 0.85 0.97
TPR (FPR=1%) Beaconing 0.77 0 0 0
Robustness score Beaconing 0.697 <0.697 0.697 0.402
AUC Multistage channels 0.85 0.56 0.72 0.58
TPR (FPR=1%) Multistage channels 0.77 0 0 0
Robustness score Multistage channels 0.697 <0.393 0.393 0.211
Connection pairs classified / second General 10,000 729.1 64.8 8.1
TABLE IV: Summary of the results. The best performing system in every category is marked in bold.
considered to have a worse impact compared to false negatives,
and therefore, we asked the experts to label a device as a non-
bot in a case of uncertainty. This decision guarantees that the
false positive rate is overestimated, rather than underestimated.
MORTON identified an average of 36 of the 10,000
(0.36%) devices as bots each week. The vast majority (61.1%)
of the classified devices were verified as malicious bots; this
was followed up by bots that could not be verified (32.65%).
The effective false positive rate, i.e., rate of non-bot detection
was 2.25 out of 10,000 devices per week on average (¡0.3%).
The real-world results are summarized in Table V.
B. Case studies
1) uBlock: One of the verified malicious bots detected was
uBlock [3] [33], which is a malicious add-on for the Chrome
browser that is disguised as an ad blocker. uBlock uses code
that was cloned to mimic a legitimate ad blocker and includes
a malicious backdoor for cookie stuffing [36], which is a
technique used to commit ad fraud. The outgoing DNS traffic
of uBlock routinely acquires the hosting IP of its servers by
using the DNS protocol. After that, uBlock sends a heartbeat
(beacon) to its servers using an HTTPS GET request to var-
ious URLs that start with “https://ublockerext.com/heartbeat.”
uBlock uses a single host name (ublockertext[.]com) with
whom it communicates every 15 minutes (see Figure 6).
The uBlock case study demonstrates MORTON’s ability to
identify bot communication to a single host name, as shown
in Section V.
2) Neshta: Neshta is spyware that connects to a remote
server in Russia and uses HTTP POST to upload informa-
tion gathered from the infected system, such as currently
installed applications, running programs, and SMTP email
TABLE V: A summary of MORTON’s results for real-world
DNS traffic.
Detected devices Bot (verified) Bot (unverified) Not a bot
Week 1 38 24 12 2
Week 2 26 13 11 2
Week 3 38 23 13 2
Week 4 42 28 11 3
Average 36 (100%) 22 (61.1%) 11.75 (32.65%) 2.25 (6.25%)
Fig. 6: Outgoing DNS queries to uBlock and Neshta, which
use a single host name
.
accounts [31]. The experts identified a device as a Neshta
bot after observing routine communication to the host name
“oneclient[.]sfx[.]ms” (see Figure 6). The host name is le-
gitimate and owned by Microsoft. However, only one other
device issued periodic DNS requests to this host name, in
contrast to 1500 other devices within the same enterprise
network that queried the host name on the DNS but did not
do so periodically. In a more in depth analysis of Nesthas
operations, our experts learned that devices infected with it are
very likely to be performing routinely beaconing to the CNC
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hosts, therefore, the communication to “oneclient[.]sfx[.]ms”
is assumed to be a connectivity test performed by the bot. The
Neshta case study demonstrates the importance of processing
a large number of disreputable host names, which is limited
in systems that indirectly classify connection pairs rather than
directly classifying devices as proposed in MORTON.
3) IsErik: IsErik [1] is a sophisticated and modular ad-
ware (sometimes referred to as DealPly or ManageX) that
uses a multistage channel to communicate with its servers.
IsErik’s infection process involves the automated and periodic
execution of code through WScript on a victim device. The
code execution includes communication to a variety of host
names and is described in a special report issued by security
vendor, Bitdefender [1], as well as a report issued by Trend
Micro [28]. The latter even refers directly to the constant time
intervals between consecutive communication, which is the
same signal that MORTON targets to identify bots. The expert
that examined MORTON’s detection of IsErik identified host
names that were publicly reported by the security community
in the VirusTotal platform. Notably, the expert also identified
host names that were accessed periodically but never reported
publicly. A time series plot of the DNS queries made by
IsErik to its servers is presented in Figure 7. The IsErik case
study demonstrates the importance of the ability of a bot
detection system to detect routine communication to multiple
host names, rather than a single host name.
Exploring the falsely detected devices uncovered two
trends. The first trend has to do with the false detection of
a periodic routine which was labeled as ”Not a bot.” This type
of false positive could be automatically removed by a post-
detection filtering mechanism that would remove detections
for which a greedy algorithm would not have been able to
retrieve the periodicity from the original signal, based on the
detected interval. Such an algorithm could be tweaked with
thresholds to minimize the false positive rate as desired. The
second trend has to do with the the correctly detected bot
activity that is unverifiable as malicious and therefore would
be considered a false positive as a security threat. In this
setting, where a detection is made from the network’s point of
view rather than the endpoint’s perspective, it is significantly
harder to trace back the threat name that is responsible for the
observed activity. Although this task is extremely challenging,
it must be successfully performed in a real-world setting, in
order to ensure that the detection is actionable and enables
the device owner to mitigate the security threat based on
the detection. Although the algorithm correctly detected the
periodic routine, and it is visibly a bot (and therefore labeled
as ”Bot”), our team of three cybersecurity experts was unable
to identify an external source to explain this activity. This trend
of unverifiable detections could lead to a possible automatic
and relaxed operation to mimic the analysis conducted by
our experts. Automatic crossing with open-source databases,
such as VirusTotal, could create an automated approach for
eliminating false positives. While this might be a more difficult
threshold than the one applied by our experts, it would be a fair
relaxation and provide a fully automated false positive removal
methodology.
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Fig. 7: Outgoing DNS requests from the IsErik modular
adware to its servers using multiple host names.
The difference between the simulated experiment and the
real-world results merits a discussion on the subject. Bot
detection in real-world DNS traffic is a more challenging
task, mainly because of the noise within the traffic, which is
characterized by time shifting, drops, and predefined “sleeps,”
etc. This is in contrast to the supervised and semi-synthetic
dataset, where we control the noise by injecting malicious
traffic. This difference reflects the importance of employing
a robust system for detection, as evaluated in Section V-D2.
To summarize, the results obtained on real-world DNS
traffic demonstrate the effectiveness of MORTON for mali-
cious bot detection in a real-world, unlabeled environment.
The importance of not considering a large number of host
names to reputable (e.g., everything in the Alexa top 1M list)
is demonstrated in the Neshta use case, while the importance
of the ability to detect multistage channels and communication
that uses multiple host names in general is illustrated in the
IsErik use case. The false positive rate of the real-world
analysis was reasonable for our experts (up to 3 out of 10,000
devices on a weekly basis and less than 0.03% of the devices
on average), but as mentioned, MORTON can be configured
for a lower acceptable false positive rate if required for a small
CERT team with less resources.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present MORTON, a system that detects
bots by analyzing DNS communication logs and identifying
routine DNS queries to disreputable host names that are
queried by a bot on behalf of an enterprise device. MORTON is
designed for large-scale corporate networks, and accordingly,
it was evaluated on a large-scale DNS dataset and compared to
the recently proposed systems, Baywatch proposed by Hu et
al. [11] and WARP as proposed by Shalaginov et. al [30] which
were also designed for large-scale networks. The evaluation
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indicates that MORTON is comparable to the two recently
proposed systems in terms of accuracy for detecting malware
beaconing but outperforms those methods when detecting
bots that communicate using advanced techniques such as
multistage channels. Additionally, MORTON was found to be
more robust and efficient than the other methods evaluated.
MORTON was also deployed in a real-world scenario, and was
applied on DNS logs that were produced by 10,000 devices
that belong to nine enterprise networks. The real-world results
of MORTON were manually verified by cybersecurity experts,
and are analyzed by use cases that show previously unreported
threats and a reasonably low rate of false positives. The latter
demonstrate the effectiveness of MORTON for real-world,
unlabeled environments.
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